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SLUMLORDISM AS A TORT-A BRIEF 
RESPONSE 
Joseph L. Sax* 
P ROFESSORS Blum and Dunham begin their comment by accusing us of having a new idea. We plead guilty.1 Our purpose was to 
demonstrate that accepted principles in analogous areas of law would 
support a slumlordism action, not to argue that tort law as presently 
applied would do so. Indeed, our basic intent was to underscore the 
myopia of existing tort law perspectives. 
They also charge us with creating a theory which might be used 
by Mississippi Delta sharecroppers or braceros to attack the "appal-
ling" (their word) situation in which they live; or by those who have 
been cheated by unscrupulous merchants. We plead guilty again, this 
time with enthusiasm.2 
They balk at a theory that affords a remedy to one subjected to 
illegally substandard housing if previously he lived in a worse rural 
dwelling. Their notion seems to be that one who has had "con-
ditioning to a submerged status"3 cannot undergo serious harm from 
subjection to slum life. It is not apparent how they would define 
harm, or humiliation, as they call it, but if they think the inhabitants 
of our urban ghettos are not filled with outrage against slumlords and 
their fellow mercantilists, or that they are somehow immunized 
against indignity,4 some field research is recommended during the 
next long, hot summer. The same must be said of their implication 
that today's urban slumdwellers are only at a temporary way station 
on the road to some middle-class Valhalla. The culture-of-poverty 
literature is precisely to the opposite effect, as we expressly noted.5 
They ask how we would distinguish the case of landlords who are 
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I. Indeed, we have done so already; our article expressly noted "that in many ways 
ours is a radical proposal ••• asking the courts to recognize a new tort or at least a 
much altered form of a traditional tort." 65 MICH. L. REv. 869, 921 (1967). 
2. Where Blum and Dunham got the notion that our proposal was "limited to slum-
lordism in urban slums" we do not know. Our article was written as a detailed applica-
tion of a general theory to one pressing social problem; it was an illustration rather 
than a limitation. 
3. 65 MICH. L. REv. 869, 882 n.64 (1967). 
4. Cf. Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278, 284 (1936): "It is interesting to note that 
in his testimony with reference to the whipping of the defendant Ellington, and in 
response to the inquiry as to how severely he was whipped, the deputy stated, 'Not too 
much for a Negro.' " 
5. 65 MicH. L. REv. 869, 902 n.126 (1967). 
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not economically motivated but who "make [housing] available free, 
as a gift."6 While this would hardly appear to be a problem of mam-
moth proportions, if they are worried about it, we shall let all such 
philanthropists slip out of our net. 
They also wonder whether the landlord could "purchase the 
consent of tenants to suffer indignities." We thought it was clear 
beyond dispute that a central purpose of having housing codes 
was to assure that landlords could not utilize their dominant eco-
nomic position to exact acquiesence in living conditions below mini-
mal standards of decency. It hardly seems likely that low income 
tenants are yearning to make such agreements on their own initi-
ative. 
The most puzzling of their objections is the fear that neither a 
jury (which, they say, embodies "the social conventions of randomly 
selected citizens") nor a judge ("from the sanctuary of his middle 
income status") will be able to identify a seriously dilapidated build-
ing when they see one. No doubt juries and judges have their prob-
lems, but why those problems should suddenly seem insuperable 
now-and in this particular setting-is difficult to understand. All 
through history courts and juries have passed on cases of incredible 
complexity, from railroad reorganizations to drug rites among the 
Indians; they have had to decide what arouses prurient interests 
and to give content to every abstract concept from sanity, due process, 
and gross negligence to ordinary and necessary business expenses-
yet we are asked to worry that they will not be able to identify a slum 
dwelling. I think we can rest confidently in the expectation that 
garbage, rats, and leaking roofs will adequately speak for themselves. 
Professors Blum and Dunham are also troubled by our view that 
one who undertakes to perform a service to advance his own eco-
nomic interests may be culpable if the service is inadequate. We 
used as an example the doctor who provides insufficient treatment 
in order to save him.self money, distinguishing that situation from 
the doctor who merely declines to act as the good samaritan. They 
assert that the medical analogy is inapposite because a special duty of 
care has always attached to that profession. This is simply not res-
ponsive to our argument, We did not ask that the law apply to a 
landlord the standards of care of the medical profession. We merely 
ask that the law hold the landlord to the standards of his profession, 
which the law already imposes upon him-that is, compliance with 
the housing codes. 
6. 66 MICH. L. REv. 429, 456 n.10 (1967). 
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They ask how we are to know when a landlord has a defense. We 
think this is rather easily answered. I£ the landlord can demonstrate 
that, despite his attempts to meet code requirements, any of the 
tenants in the building undermine his efforts by their own miscon-
duct, we would give him a defense, not expecting him to do more 
than make a reasonable effort toward code compliance.7 Blum and 
Dunham think that, under such a test, the landlord would prevail in 
almost every case. We have rather more faith in the tenants and their 
ability to organize for common benefit. We could be wrong, but we 
ask only that this proposition be tested in application, not in theory. 
Much of the remainder of their comment is given over to specu-
lation. How do we know that landlords will not purposely select 
tenants who are likely to harm the building, in order to avoid future 
liability? Or that they will not avoid renting to poor people, or that 
verdicts will not be excessive? Or that landlords will not find ways 
to become judgment proof? Or that retroactivity problems will not 
prove unmanageable? We don't, any more than we knew that abo-
lition of the fellow-servant rule or the privity requirement or the 
development of products liability would not promote intolerably 
adverse consequences on business. Theirs is simply the argument for 
never changing anything, for one can never issue a certificate of 
assurance about the future. We think we have made at least a prima 
fade case for our proposal. Under such circumstances, one who 
wishes to argue the impropriety of a new approach to a concededly 
serious problem has the responsibility to adduce some specific evi-
dence to support his doubts; otherwise, the status quo becomes 
frozen by the very fact that it is the status quo, since any change 
could be for the worse. 
Blum and Dunham's concern that the tort action may actually 
reduce the stock of low cost housing misconceives the central point of 
our article. We are not out to reform the landlord (who, we agree, 
cannot afford to provide standard housing for the poor); we seek to 
create a pressure situation leading to additional legislative subsidiza-
tion of low cost housing. Dislocation of the present housing situa-
tion, which is comfortable enough for the slum landlord, is the 
means for creating that pressure. We recognized in our article that 
such dislocation involves risks for the tenants, and we only sought to 
give them the opportunity to decide whether the present housing 
situation is bad enough to make it worth taking that risk; we hold 
7. Naturally such a defense would not be available to a landlord who hired a tenant 
to undermine tenant organizing efforts. 
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to the view that this is a decision tenants ought to be permitted to 
make for themselves. 
The receivership notion must also confront the unprofitability of 
providing standard quality housing for the very poor. Of course one 
can put a building in receivership, acquire money for rehabilitation, 
and then substantially increase the rents. No doubt, as Blum and 
Dunham note, one can even acquire private investment funds for 
such a project. But-other than government financed demonstration 
projects-how many seriously dilapidated buildings housing the very 
poor have been put in receivership, rehabilitated up to standard, and 
then re-rented at prices which the previous tenants could afford? 
That is the real test of a receivership program, and we are still wait-
ing for those statistics. 
